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at the time of budgeting in constructing our explanatory variables. Our estimates indicate 
that  policies  have  reacted  to  the  state  of  public  finances  in  a  stabilizing  manner.  The 
European rules have significantly affected the behaviour of countries with excessive deficits. 
Apart from these cases, the rules appear to have reaffirmed existing preferences. We find a 
relatively large symmetrical counter-cyclical reaction of fiscal policy and strong evidence of 
a political budget cycle. The electoral manipulation of fiscal policy, however, occurs only if 
the macroeconomic context is favourable.  
 
 
JEL classification numbers: E61, D72, E62, H60 
Keywords: fiscal policy, real-time information, euro-area countries, stabilisation policies, 
fiscal rules, political budget cycle 
 
 
                                                           
*  Roberto Golinelli: University of Bologna, Department of Economics. 





2. Model specification and statistical validation....................................................................10 
3. The data .............................................................................................................................15 
4. Main results .......................................................................................................................18 
5. The reactions to the state of public finances and the role of Maastricht ...........................22 
6. The reactions to cyclical conditions ..................................................................................25 
7. The role of the political budget cycle................................................................................28 
8. The effects on estimates of using ex post data...................................................................32 
9. Conclusions........................................................................................................................33 
Appendix 1 – From the general to the base model.................................................................38 





Over the last decade, a large body of literature has analysed the characteristics of fiscal 
policies  in  the  OECD  countries  (e.g.  Bohn,  1998;  Melitz,  2000;  European  Commission, 
2001; Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2002; Buti, 2002 and IMF, 2004). In this paper we 
contribute to this area of research in three respects. 
First, we use the same model to analyse the role of the following four factors: (i) the 
initial state of public finances, (ii) the European fiscal rules, (iii) cyclical conditions and (iv) 
the political budget cycle. Previous studies have often focused on one specific factor, adding 
a number of control variables that are often not fully discussed. By including all four factors 
and by carefully specifying them, we hope to avoid the risk of biased estimates arising from 
omitted  variables.  Moreover,  we  explicitly  derive  our  model  from  a  very  general  one, 
checking the restrictions that we impose on it. 
Second, we focus on the euro-area countries, whereas many studies include all OECD 
countries for which data are available. We show that the fiscal policies in the euro area are 
relatively homogeneous, while this is not true for our full sample of OECD countries. 
Finally, unlike most studies, this one explains fiscal policies largely on the basis of the 
information actually available at the time budgetary decisions were taken and not on the 
basis of the latest available (ex post) data. This choice is inspired by the work of Orphanides 
(1998,  2001)  who  has  shown  how  important  real-time  data  are  to  understand  monetary 
policy in the United States. A few recent papers have taken the same direction, controlling 
for errors in forecasting when assessing the response of fiscal policy to cyclical conditions 
and elections (Larch and Salto, 2003; Buti and Vand den Noord, 2003 and 2004; Mink and 
De Haan, 2005). However, cyclical conditions are still measured on the basis of ex post data. 
Forni and Momigliano (2004) assess the budgetary reaction to cyclical conditions over the 
last decade in the euro area and in the OECD countries on the basis of both real-time and ex 
post estimates of output gaps. They show that the use of ex post data may significantly bias 
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the estimates. Here, we also use real-time data for the general government balance, given 
that  in  some  countries  (in  particular,  Greece)  significant  revisions  have  occurred  in  the 
sample period. Furthermore, we include election dummies among the regressors and extend 
the period of analysis to the years before Maastricht, which allows us to discuss the role 
played by the European rules. 
  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  discuss  the 
specification of the fiscal rule we estimate. In Section 3 we describe the data set used in our 
analysis,  focusing  largely  on  the  construction  of  the  real-time  estimates  of  cyclical 
conditions. In Section 4 we analyse our main results and present some robustness exercises. 
In Sections 5-7, respectively, we discuss in detail the impact on fiscal policies of the state of 
public finances and the European fiscal rules, the cyclical conditions and the position in the 
electoral cycle. In Section 8 we examine how our estimates change if we use ex post instead 
of real-time data. Section 9 concludes. In Appendix 1 we show how we derive our base 
model, which implies the estimation of 25 parameters (of which 19 are time dummies), from 
a general specification with 91 parameters. In Appendix 2 we present additional tests of the 
robustness of our results. 
2. Model specification and statistical validation 
As in a number of studies (e.g. Taylor, 2000; European Commission, 2001; Auerbach, 
2002; Cohen and Follette, 2003; Galí and Perotti, 2003),
2 we estimate a fiscal rule in which 
the discretionary fiscal action, measured by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance,
3 is explained by the cyclical conditions (measured by the output gap) and the state 
of  public  finances  (measured  by  the  primary  balance  and  the  debt  of  the  general 
government).  In  addition,  we  include  two  explanatory  variables  meant  to  capture  the 
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2  Some authors, among which Galí and Perotti (2003), use as dependent variable the level of the CAPB, 
instead of its change. In principle, if we had included, as those authors do, the lagged level of the dependent 
variable among the regressors, the two specifications would be equivalent (giving the same estimates for all 
coefficients except for that of the lagged dependent variable, for which  our estimates would be equal to those 
of the other specification plus 1). In fact, we use among the regressors the primary balance not adjusted for the 
cycle, so that there is not a strict correspondence between the two specifications. 
3  We are aware that the change in CAPB gauges with some error the discretionary actions taken by the 
fiscal authorities but, in our opinion, there is no alternative proposed in the literature that is clearly preferable.     11 
electoral cycle and one meant to capture the impact of the European fiscal rules on the 
behaviour of countries that were in an excessive deficit position. 
As  for  the  latter  regressor,  we  basically  follow  Forni  and  Momigliano  (2004)  in 
introducing a regressor, mit (also referred to as the Maastricht variable) which defines a 
benchmark correction of the primary balance which is a function of the excessive deficit, the 
number of years in which the latter needs to be eliminated and the expected contribution 
from interest payments (see Box below).
4 
 
Box – Modelling the European fiscal rules 
When modelling the European fiscal rules, as defined by the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact, we focus only on the requirement to correct the deficit when it 
exceeds the 3% of GDP threshold. In particular, we do not include an explicit rule for 
the  medium term  target  of  a  “close  to  balance  or  in  surplus  budgetary  position” 
(introduced by the Stability Pact in 1997) for two reasons. First, meeting the target is not 
supported by any formal sanction and it rests largely on the country’s willingness to 
comply. Second, the rule is not fully defined (and the same applies to the “medium term 
targets” differentiated across countries in the new version of the Pact introduced in 
2005).
(a)  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  reactions  to  the  initial  conditions  that  we  find  in 
operation, at least since 1988, are  broadly consistent with meeting the medium term 
targets. 
The Maastricht variable mit is set equal to zero in the years before 1992 or if the deficit is 
below the 3% threshold. For the years 1992 96, mit is equal to the difference between the 
deficit and 3% of GDP, divided by the number of years leading up to 1997
(b) and then 
reduced by the expected change in interest expenditure in the following year. Formally: 
mit = [  (obit – (–3%)) / [1998 – (t+1)]  ] – D init+1 
where D is the first difference operator, all variables are defined as a ratio to GDP; ob is 
the overall balance (a negative value corresponds to a deficit) and in is the interest 
payment, subscripts i and t refer, respectively, to the individual countries and to the year. 
The formula implies a reduction of the excessive deficit (i.e. above the 3% threshold) 
inversely  proportional  to  the  number  of  years  leading  up  to  1997  and  net  of  the 
contribution expected from interest payments. After 1996, the provisions of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (in principle, also of its 2005 version) require countries to correct an 
                                                           
4  We differ from the proposal in Forni and Momigliano (2004) essentially in two respects. First, when 
computing the needed correction of the primary deficit, we subtract the expected change in interest payments. 
We do so because, especially for the years 1992-96, for some countries the contribution to the consolidation 
coming from the fall in interest rates was large and could be forecast with a significant precision. Second, as a 
result of specific tests (see Appendix 1), when the Maastricht variable is different from zero, we exclude all the 
other explanatory variables from the fiscal rule.     12 
excessive deficit in the year after its official recognition, which usually occurs with a 
one year lag. Therefore, in the first year that an excessive deficit occurs, we substitute in 
the denominator of the formula the constant 2 to the expression [1998 – (t+1)]. If the 
excessive deficit persists, mit equals the full difference with respect to the threshold, net 
of the expected contribution from interest payments. 
Throughout the period 1992 2006, if the expected reduction in interest expenditure is 
larger than the correction required in t+1 for the overall balance, mit is set to zero. 
Therefore mit takes either a negative sign or is equal to zero. 
————————————— 
(a)  The reform of the Growth and Stability Pact, endorsed by Ecofin in April 2005, is based on two new 
European Council Regulations: Council Regulation 1055/2005, amending Council Regulation 1466/97, 
and Council Regulation 1056/2005, amending Council Regulation 1467/97. 
(b)  Participation in the Monetary Union required achieving a deficit smaller than 3% of GDP in 1997. 
For Greece, the reference period is extended up to 1998, the year in which the country qualified for 
entering the Union. 
 
 
Our base fiscal rule (hereinafter, base model) is the result of a process of reduction 
from a very general specification, in which it is nested. In the process, all the restrictions that 
we impose are validated by statistical tests, which indicate that the restricted model does not 
entail a loss of relevant information (the procedure followed and the test results are reported 
in Appendix 1). 
The  general  unrestricted  model  (GUM),  in  addition  to  the  six  policy  parameters 
mentioned above, allows for: (i) fixed country and time effects, (ii) different parameters for 
the Maastricht variable for the period 1993-97 and for the period 1998-2006, and (iii) five 
dummy variables for Germany for the years 1990-94, meant to control for the unification 
process. Moreover, the GUM allows for different values for the set of parameters (including 
country  and  time  effects)  depending  on  whether  a  country  is  or  is  not  in  a  situation  of 
excessive deficit (more precisely, on whether our Maastricht variable is negative or equal to 
zero) and on whether the output gap is positive or negative. In principle, this specification 
requires the estimation of four sets of parameters, depending on the sign of the output gap 
and of the Maastricht variable. However, when the latter differs from zero, output gaps are 
always negative and this reduces the number of sets to three. The absence of observations for 
other  intersections  of  states  further  reduces  the  number  of  country  and  time  effects     13 
parameters to be estimated. Overall, the GUM has 91 parameters, including 31 individual 
effects and 38 time effects. 
The base model resulting from the above-mentioned process of reduction from the 
GUM includes 25 parameters, 19 of which are time dummies. A particularly noteworthy 
result is represented by the elimination of the fixed effects, i.e. the systematic effects related 
to individual countries. Contrary to previous studies, we find that they are not statistically 
significant, indicating that fiscal policies in the euro area tend to be relatively homogeneous, 
once their main determinants are taken into account.
5 
The base model is represented by two equations, which apply depending on whether 
the Maastricht variable is negative or equal to zero. 
If the Maastricht variable is equal to zero (i.e., either the year preceeds 1992 or the 
deficit does not exceed the threshold or the required correction in t+1 of the overall balance 








it x it d it pb it u e e x d pb capb + + + + + = D + - - - 1 2 1 1 1 1 f f f f f  
where all the variables except the dummies for elections are defined as a ratio to GDP, capb 
is the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance (a negative sign indicates a deficit), pb is 
the primary balance, d is the debt level, x is the output gap, e
p is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in the year of regular elections (defined as those held at the end of a full term) if the output 
gap is positive when budgetary decisions are taken, and subscripts i and t refer, respectively, 
to the individual countries and to the year. Finally, the error-term u embodies time effect lt 
and random eit unobservable components. 
The coefficients fpb and fd gauge the impact on fiscal policies of the state of public 
finances  at  the  time  budgetary  decisions  are  taken  (t–1):  a  negative  value  of  fpb  and  a 
positive value of fd indicate that the higher the initial levels of debt and deficit, the greater 
the tightening of fiscal policy. 
The coefficient  x f  (positive if policies are countercyclical) captures the response of 
budgetary actions to current cyclical conditions, i.e. the cyclical conditions of the year in     14 
which budgetary decisions are taken (t–1). The variable xt–1 is a plausible alternative to xt, as 
Galí  and  Perotti  (2003)  also  recognize,  given  the  inertia  and  complexity  of  the 
decision-making process. Moreover, the values of output gaps are highly persistent, so that 
the two choices lead to similar results, as shown in Forni and Momigliano (2004).
6 We have 
also  estimated  our  base  model  with  xt  instead  of  xt–1  (Appendix  2)  without  significant 
differences in the results. The two parameters  1 e
p f
 and  2 e
p f  measure the effects of regular 
general elections, provided that the output gap is positive, in the year in which they are held 
and in the previous year, respectively. If the sign of these parameters is negative, it implies 
that,  ceteris  paribus,  the  fiscal  stance  loosens  in  the  presence  of  elections.  In  the  tests 
performed on the general unrestricted model, of all the parameters only the reactions to 
elections is found to be statistically different depending on the output gap being positive or 
negative. As the value of the election parameters in case of adverse economic conditions is 
not significantly different from zero (Tables 3 and A1.2), we exclude the corresponding 
regressors from our base model. In Section 7 we explore some alternative specifications for 
the electoral variables which take into account the month, or the quarter, in which elections 
are held. 
As for the distinction between the countries having and not having an excessive deficit, 
the tests performed on the general unrestricted model indicate a significant difference in all 
the relevant policy parameters (Table A1.2). If the Maastricht variable differs from zero (i.e. 
if it is necessary to correct the primary balance in order to eliminate the excessive overall 
deficit), all the other explanatory variables in our model are not statistically significant and 
can be  excluded  from  the  model  without loss of  relevant information.
7  Therefore, if  mit 
differs from zero our base specification of the fiscal rule is: 
[1b]  it it m it m capb e f + = D -1  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
5  A full proof of this claim, obviously, would require formally testing for poolability with respect to 
individual countries. This is not possible, as the number of observations is too limited. 
6  We prefer using  xt–1  instead of xt largely for statistical reasons. First, the latter requires the recourse to 
instrumental variables, as the output gap is affected by fiscal policy, which opens up to a number of equally 
acceptable alternatives, with a potential indeterminacy on the results. Second, our estimates of the output gap in 
real time are less subject to a possible end-point bias in the case of  xt–1  rather than in the case of xt (see 
Section 3). 
7  These results confirm and extend those of van den Noord (2002), who finds that the euro-area countries 
that needed to consolidate their public finances tended to neglect the stabilization function.     15 
A value of –1 for fm would suggest that policymakers strictly followed the proportional 
correction formula shown in the Box. 
Throughout  the  paper  we  usually  report  results  for  both  our  base  model  and  a 
specification in which equation [1a] is applied to all the observations (hereinafter, Eq. [1a] 
model). In our view, the base model has the advantage of avoiding possible misspecification 
problems, as the data indicate that countries with an excessive deficit significantly modified 
their policies. On the other hand, the Eq. [1a]  model does not have the shortcoming of 
including a somewhat ad hoc regressor, such as the Maastrich variable. In all cases, the two 
models give the same indications. 
3. The data 
The full sample covers 19 OECD countries, including 11 countries of the euro area 
(only Luxembourg is excluded for lack of data), 3 other European countries (the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark) and 5 non-European countries (the United States, Japan, 
Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand).
8  All  the  economic  variables  are  from  OECD 
publications (except in some of the exercises which test for robustness). The data set on 
elections (reported in Table 6) is constructed using the data base of the International Institute 
for  Democracy  and  Electoral  Assistance  (IDEA)  and  the  information  available  in 
www.electionguide.org, integrated and checked with Routledge (2005). 
Our dependent variable ( capb) is, for each country, the currently available estimate 
published by the OECD (from the OECD December 2005 Economic Outlook, hereinafter 
EO). We use the latest vintage of data because they represent, by definition, the most precise 
assessment of the discretionary fiscal actions taken by governments. For robustness, we also 
use the latest available estimates of the International Monetary Fund, from the March 2006 
WEO, and of the European Commission, from the Autumn 2005 Forecast (see Table 1, 
Section 4). 
As for the explanatory variables, we use real-time estimates to compute the Maastricht 
variable, for the primary balance (or, in alternative specifications, for the overall balance, see 
Section 5) and for the cyclical conditions. We do so because all these variables are subject to 
                                                           
8  The current information on our dependent variable (Annex Table 30 of the December 2005 EO) refers to 
24 OECD countries. However, 5 countries were included only very recently.     16 
large revisions over time. We use the latest available information on the general government 
debt, as the OECD did not publish comparable data on the debt until recently. The use of ex 
post data for the debt should not lead to significant distortions, as over the last years the 
revisions to the initial estimates have been a small fraction of the debt level and it is likely 
that this holds true also for the years for which we do not have this information. 
Budget documents are, in principle, the most direct source of the real-time information 
available  to  policy-makers,  but  they  often  do  not  report  the  data  we  need  and,  more 
generally, the estimates included may be distorted for political reasons (connected with the 
possibility  of  “announcement  effects”)  or  not  comparable,  reflecting  differences  in  risk 
aversion  (see,  for  a  discussion  on  these  aspects,  Forni  and  Momigliano,  2004).  For  this 
reason, we rely for all countries on the estimates included in the December EOs published by 
the OECD. 
In the countries that we examine, the budget for year t+1 is usually finalised at the end 
of year t. Therefore, the December EOs are based on an information set which is temporally 
aligned to that available to national policymakers when taking budgetary decisions for the 
following year. Considering also that OECD estimates and forecasts for fiscal variables and 
for GDP are extensively discussed with national experts, it seems reasonable to assume they 
should be close to those on which budgetary decisions are based.
9 
From the various issues of December EOs, starting from 1989, we directly use the real-
time estimates of the general government primary and overall balance and interest payments. 
For the years 1987 and 1988, for which real-time budgetary data data are not available, we 
rely on the information available in 1989. The use of the 1989-information set for budgetary 
data  should  not  lead  to  significant  distortions,  as  it  is  temporally  close  to  the  real-time 
information set and, in our knowledge, large revisions of the initial estimates have been 
registered only in more recent years. 
As for cyclical conditions, the OECD started to publish estimates of the output gap 
only in the EO of December 1995.
10 To overcome this limitation we compute the output gaps 
                                                           
9  The EOs are made available to the general public at the beginning of December, but a preliminary 
version of the Report is discussed with national delegates (usually from the Finance Ministries) between the 
end of October and the beginning of November. 
10  In Forni and Momigliano (2004), the estimates of the output gaps implicit in the 1993 and 1994 EOs are 
approximately computed on the basis of the estimates of the cyclical component of the budget.     17 
on  the  basis  of  the  series  of  GDP  growth,  published  in  the  December  EO  since  1987. 
Therefore,  we  can  calculate  implicitly-available  estimates  for  output  gaps  for  the  years 
1987-2005, which bear on policy actions for the years 1988-2006. To compute the gap we 
employ the filter proposed in Mohr (2005). The filter, which represents an extension of the 
widely  used  Hodrick-Prescott  filter,  avoids  the  bias  in  end-of-sample  estimates  which 
characterises the latter. This is very important, as we need to estimate the cyclical component 
of year t with a series ending in t+2.
11 In Appendix 2 we present results based on the more 
traditional Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
We consider among explanatory variables the regular national elections (i.e. those held 
at the end of a full term)
12 as they could be expected by policymakers when budgeting, both 
for  the  year  in  which  they  were  held  and  for  the  previous  year.  We  consider  only 
parliamentary elections, the only exception being the U.S., where we regard the presidential 
elections  as  more  relevant.  In  Section  5,  for  comparability  with  other  studies  where  all 
elections were considered (e.g. Mink and De Haan, 2005), we present the results of a model 
which includes an additional regressor for early elections.
13 
Our analysis covers three distinctly different periods: (i) the years 1988-92, preceding 
the Maastricht Treaty (which was signed in February 1992 and went into force in 1993); (ii) 
the years 1993-97, when participation in the Monetary Union required achieving, in 1997, a 
deficit below the 3% of GDP; and (iii) the years 1998-2006, during which fiscal policies have 
been conducted within the framework established by the Stability and Growth Pact (signed in 
1997). 
In terms of cyclical developments, we are able to fully encompass at least two full 
business cycles. The period includes, in particular, two almost generalised downturns: at the 
beginning  of  the  nineties  and  at the turn  of the century.  The sample is almost evenly split 
                                                           
11  To avoid the end-of-sample bias of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, series are usually extended further, 
at least to t+4. Using the filter proposed by Mohr (2005) in place of the HP filter, we achieve the same 
objective without introducing an element of arbitrariness in our procedure. For a number of years and countries, 
the OECD publishes, in addition to the growth in year t+2, an estimate for the growth in its last semester or 
quarter. In these cases, we use the latter estimates as proxies for expected growth in t+3. 
12  We consider an election being “regular” if it takes place in the year in which the term ends or if the 
anticipation with respect to the end-of-term date does not exceed 6 months. 
13  While it is true that in many cases these early elections could not have been expected when budgeting 
for the year in which they were held, they could be regarded as a lagged proxy of the political difficulties that 
led to them.     18 
between positive and negative output gaps. For the euro area we have, respectively, 101 and 
108 observations (69 and 83, respectively, for the other 8 countries). 
Our GDP-growth-based estimates of output gaps are generally close to those published 
by the OECD, for the years for which this comparison is possible (including the years 1993-
94 for which indirect estimates of the OECD data are available). The standard deviation of 
the two sets of data, for the euro area, is similar: 1.4 and 1.8 respectively; their coefficient of 
correlation is 0.7. There is a slight difference in the average value, equal to –0.4 in our 
estimates and to –1.0 in those of the OECD. The number of positive and negative gaps is 
more balanced in our estimates. In Table A2 of Appendix 2 we compare our estimates for 
the period 1994-2006 with those obtained using, in our base model, the estimates of output 
gaps published by the OECD. The results are qualitatively similar. 
4. Main results 
In this section we discuss the main results of our model for the euro area and the 
indications gathered from some exercises meant to test robustness (additional exercises are 
presented in Appendix 2). We also examine how the same model fares if applied to the 8 
countries outside the area included in our sample. 
Our  base  model  (column  “BASE”  of  Table  1),  applied  to  the  euro-area  countries, 
explains approximately 38 per cent of the variability of budgetary actions between countries 
and over time. The model satisfies the standard misspecification tests (see Table A1.1 in 
Appendix 1); furthermore, the Chow test for parameter constancy over the three sub-periods 
1988-92, 1993-97 and 1998-2006 does not identify any structural breaks (with a p value of 
57.0%).  All  the  estimated  parameters  have  the  expected  sign.  They  are  also  highly 
significant, except those capturing the 1-year-before effect of elections. However, the two 
election parameters are jointly significant, with a p value of 0.02%. 
The estimates of the coefficients of the primary balance and the debt indicate that 
fiscal policies react to the initial state of public finances in a stabilizing manner. Given the 
absence of individual fixed effects, fiscal policies aim in the long run at reducing to zero the 
level of both variables and, implicitly, of the overall balance. As for the reaction to the 
primary balance, the coefficient  (–0.19)  indicates that, ceteris paribus, one fifth of the     19 
 
Table 1 
MAIN RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS
(1) 
 
  11 countries of the euro area  Other samples 
  BASE  Eq. [1a]
(2)  BASE-sy
(3)  BASE-IMF  BASE-EC  8 OECD  19 OECD 
fpb  –0.192  –0.222  –0.188  –0.169  –0.172  –0.141  –0.173 
  –4.39  –5.72  –4.21  –3.65  –3.83  –3.63  –6.53 
fd  0.011  0.012  0.011  0.008  0.007  0.005  0.008 
  3.03  3.93  3.00  2.19  1.91  1.26  3.00 
fm  –0.619    –0.619  –0.621  –0.543    –0.619 
  –6.09    –5.99  –5.79  –5.16    –6.06 
fx  0.427  0.302  0.345  0.320  0.426  0.086  0.309 
  3.82  3.43  3.13  2.72  3.75  0.94  4.72 
f
 (p)
e1  –1.366  –1.283    –1.349  –1.419  –0.311  –0.797 
  –4.16  –3.96    –3.89  –4.23  –0.87  –3.32 
f
 (p)
e2  –0.551  –0.482    –0.444  –0.606  –0.274  –0.321 
  –1.77  –1.59    –1.36  –1.91  –0.75  –1.38 
fe1      –0.953         
      –3.37         
fe2      –0.342         
      –1.39         
N. of obs.
(4)  209  209  209  209  196  152  361 
RMSE 
(5)  1.118  1.141  1.137  1.179  1.128  1.087  1.124 
R
2  0.381  0.352  0.360  0.345  0.358  0.396  0.326 
R
2 adjusted  0.297  0.268  0.273  0.256  0.265  0.277  0.265 
 
(1) T-statistics are reported below the estimates. The estimates of 19 time-dummies are not 
reported. 
(2) Eq. [1a] is applied to all observations. 
(3) Base model but election parameters independent of the sign of the output gap (p value of 
the restrictions = 5.1%). 
(4) 13 observations are missing in the data from the European Commission (EC). 
(5) Root Mean Squared Error. 
Parameters 
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imbalance is corrected in the following year. The reaction to the debt is equal to 1% of the 
outstanding stock. 
For a cost of the debt (5.5%) close to the average value in our sample (5.1%) the 
estimate of the parameter for the debt implies a reaction to interest payments equal to that 
estimated  for  the  primary  balance.  This  suggests  the  need  for  explicitly  comparing  this 
specification with a more parsimonious one, including only the overall balance. This analysis 
is conducted in Section 5. 
The Maastricht variable estimate (–0.62) would suggest that Governments have chosen 
a more back-loaded strategy than our proportional benchmark, though the result may also be 
partly due to approximations in our formula.
14 
The coefficient for the output gap is positive, pointing to a counter-cyclical reaction of 
fiscal policy to economic conditions, as assessed at the time budgetary decisions were taken. 
The reaction is sizeable, as the estimated coefficient implies that a 1 per cent negative output 
gap induces, ceteris paribus, a discretionary expansion amounting to 0.43 per cent of GDP. 
Finally, we find a large impact of regular elections, conditional on cyclical conditions 
being  assessed  as  being  favourable  when  budgetary  decisions  are  taken:  they  induce  a 
loosening of the fiscal stance equal to 1.4 per cent of GDP in the year in which they are held 
and of 0.6 per cent in the year before (the latter estimate is only 10% significant). 
In columns 2-4 of Table 1 we check the robustness of our estimates to, respectively, (i) 
the exclusion of the Maastricht variable (“Eq. [1a]” column), (ii) the imposition that the 
effects of elections be constant across good and bad times (“BASE-sy” column) and (iii) the 
use of alternative estimates of the dependent variable. 
The exclusion of the Maastricht variable, i.e. allowing Eq. [1a] to be applied to all 
observations, induces a slight worsening in the explanatory power of our model, but leaves 
the estimates of the other parameters and their levels of significance largely unaffected. 
There is only a slight reduction in the point estimate of the reaction to the output gap and a 
slight increase in those to the initial state of the public finances. Analogously to what we 
found for the base model, the Chow test for parameter constancy over the three sub-periods 
specified above does not identify any structural breaks (with a p-value of 44.6%).     21 
Assuming that the effects of elections are constant across good and bad times alike has 
negligeable  effects  on  the  values  of  the  other  parameters  (in  particular,  it  does  not 
significantly modify the estimate of the coefficient for the output gap) but, obviously, lowers 
the estimated impact of elections. 
Finally, the results do not change significantly if the latest available OECD estimates 
of our dependent variable are substituted with those of the International Monetary Fund 
(from the March 2006 WEO, “IMF” column) and the European Commission (Autumn 2005 
Forecast, “EC” column). 
In column 5 (“8 OECD”) of Table 1 we follow the same estimation procedure outlined 
in Section 2 – i.e., from a general model to a restricted one - to assess the determinants of the 
fiscal policies of the 8 countries of our sample outside the euro area.
15 The estimates of the 
restricted  model  (which  includes  an  individual  effect  for  Japan)  suggest  the  absence  of 
systematic reactions to cyclical conditions and of an electoral budget cycle. The responses to 
the initial state of public finances are slightly smaller and, especially in the case of the debt, 
less precisely estimated.
16 
Finally, in column 6 (“19 OECD”) we assess the determinants of the fiscal policies of 
our  full  sample  of  19  OECD  countries,  following  once  more  the  procedure  outlined  in 
Section  2.  The  results,  based  on  a  model  which  includes  individual  effects  for  the  5 
non-European  countries  of  the  sample,
  are  broadly  in  line  with  those  for  the  euro  area, 
masking  the  substantial  heterogeneity  of  the  two  groups  of  countries  (as  shown  by  the 
comparison between columns 2 and 6). Clearly, the good performance of the model for the 
sample of 19 OECD countries is explained exclusively by the information included in the 
euro-area data. This result shows the potential risks of pooling groups of countries with 
different characteristics without checking for parameter constancy between them. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
14  For simplicity, we do not take into account the expected contribution of the cycle in the following years. 
Moreover, when defining the Maastricht variable we assume that policymakers expect that the contribution 
from interest payments in year t+1 to the overall correction remains unchanged in the following years. 
15  We cannot reject the hypothesis of parameters poolability of the 3 non-EMU European countries with 
the 5 non-European OECD countries (the p value of the relevant test is equal to 41.2%). The 3 countries are 
considerably less poolable with the 11 euro area countries (the p value of the test is 8.9%). 
16  The difficulty of applying our fiscal rule to the 3 non-euro-area countries  may be due to the fact that for 
two of them the budget is influenced by revenues from oil production.     22 
 
5.  The reactions to the state of public finances and the role of Maastricht 
As shown in the previous section, our estimates indicate that fiscal policy reacts in a 
stabilizing manner to the levels of the primary balance and of the debt. These results are 
robust to the changes examined in Table 1 (Section 4). Moreover, if we allow for different 
values of fpb and fd, depending on whether cyclical conditions are favourable or adverse, the 
two sets of parameters do not significantly differ (see Table 3 in Section 6). 
In Table 2, we split our sample period in the three sub-periods 1988-92, 1993-97 and 
1998-2006,  presenting  for  robustness  the  estimates  both  for  the  base  model  and  for  the 
model in which Eq. [1a] is applied to all observations. 
 
Table 2 
Estimation Results over Sub-periods
(1) 
PARAMETER  BASE MODEL  Eq. [1a] MODEL
(2) 
  1988-2006 
(3)  1988-92  1993-97  Obs.
(5)  1998-06  1988-2006 
(3)  1993-97  Obs.
(4)  1998-06 
fpb  –0.192  –0.165  –0.756  (13)  –0.208  –0.222  –0.330  (55)  –0.239 
  –4.39  –2.41  –2.73    –2.82  –5.72  –3.55    –3.86 
fd  0.011  0.011  0.078  (13)  0.009  0.012  0.024  (55)  0.010 
  3.03  1.93  3.01    1.64  3.93  3.49    2.15 
fm  –0.619    –0.603  (42)  –0.821         
  –6.09    –6.14    –2.45         
fx  0.427  0.378  0.098  (13)  0.445  0.302  0.109  (55)  0.452 
  3.82  1.66  0.22    3.21  3.43  0.72    3.58 
f
 (p)
e1  –1.366  –1.790  1.834  (1)  –1.290  –1.283  0.183  (1)  –1.265 
  –4.16  –2.59  1.27 
5    –3.33  –3.96  0.15    –3.41 
f
 (p)
e2  –0.551  –0.196  –0.069  (3)  –0.822  –0.482  –0.046  (3)  –0.830 
  –1.77  –0.34  –0.05    –2.03  –1.59  –0.06    –2.06 
No. of obs.  209  55  55    99  209  55    99 
RMSE 
(5)  1.118  1.360  1.038    1.011  1.141  1.123    1.009 
R
2  0.381  0.345  0.545    0.388  0.352  0.455    0.383 
R
2 adjusted  0.297  0.200  0.432    0.279  0.268  0.334    0.281 
 
(1) T-statistics are reported below the estimates. The estimates for the time-dummies are not 
reported. 
(2) Eq. [1a] is estimated over the whole euro-area countries sample. For the 1988-92 column 
see the corresponding BASE column. 
(3) The p values of test for parameters constancy over time (Chow test) are, respectively, 
45.7% for the base model, and 35.9% for Eq. [1a]) model. 
(4) Number of non-zero observations for the corresponding regressor. 
(5) Root Mean Squared Error.     23 
 
Focusing on the reactions to the primary balance and the debt, the estimates tend to 
remain, even in the sub-periods, significant. The point estimates of the initial and last sub-
periods, both for variables and models, are also relatively close. A larger stabilizing reaction 
to the state of public finances can be detected, for the period 1993-97, both in the case of the 
base  model  (where,  however,  the  estimates  of  these  parameters  are  based  on  thirteen 
observations only) and in the specification Eq. [1a]. The larger reaction to imbalances, and 
the simultaneous loss of significance for the effects of cyclical conditions and elections, is 
consistent with the political climate of that period, particularly favourable to the pursuit of 
sustainable public finances. 
It  is  still  highly  controversial  whether  the  Maastricht  Treaty  simply  reaffirmed 
pre-existing  preferences  or,  instead,  it  created  its  own  political  dynamics  inducing 
governments  to  undertake  consolidations  they  would  not  have  effected  otherwise.  Von 
Hagen et al. (2002), on the basis of the comparison of the estimates of a fiscal rule for the 
year  1972-89  and  for  the  years  1990-98,  argue  that  the  Treaty  had  an  impact  on  fiscal 
policies as they find a positive shift in the intercept term between the two periods in the 
direction of surpluses. Our results, though not strictly comparable (we examine only five 
years  of  policies  preceding  Maastricht  and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  include  eight  years 
beyond 1998), are less univocal, but tend to support the opposite view. 
In favour of a “Maastricht effect” there is the strengthening of the stabilizing reaction 
to  imbalances  (both  in  terms  of  primary  balance  and  of  debt)  in  the  1993-97  period, 
compared to the previous period. However, the tightening is only temporary and there is no 
clear evidence of a structural break.
17 We also find that the behaviour of the countries in 
excessive  deficit  throughout  the  period  1993-2006  is  more  accurately  captured  by  a 
specifically  constructed  regressor  (the  Maastricht  variable),  defined  on  the  basis  of  the 
European rules. However, the exclusion of the Maastricht variable leaves the explanatory 
power  of  the  model  and  the  estimates  of  the  reactions  to  cyclical  conditions  broadly 
unchanged, as indicated by the results of the Eq. [1a] model. Overall, we conclude that the 
European fiscal rules only reaffirmed preferences that can already be detected in the years 
                                                           
17  As mentioned in Section 4, the tests for parameter constancy do not identify any structural breaks over 
the three different sub-periods, for both the base and the Eq. [1a] models.     24 
immediately  preceding  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht.  It  is  possible,  however,  that  those 
preferences would have not remained stable in the absence of the Treaty. 
The use of the primary balance and the debt to account for the initial conditions of 
public finances is relatively standard in the literature, but it is also plausible that fiscal policy 
would react, instead, to the overall balance. To assess this alternative fiscal rule, we have 
estimated a model substituting the primary balance and the debt with the overall balance, 
once  more  following  the  procedure  from  general  to  specific  outlined  in  Section  2.  The 
estimate obtained for the parameter of the overall balance (0.40) is not significantly different 
from that of the base model for the primary balance (0.43), while that for all the other 
parameters is virtually identical.
18 However, the explanatory power of the model with the 
overall balance is slightly worse than that of our base model, suggesting a greater role for 
both primary deficit and debt in influencing policy decisions. Formal tests point in the same 
direction.
19 Moreover, focusing on the debt (as in the base model) instead of its cost (implied 
by a fiscal rule based on the overall balance) is, in principle, a better rule, as it avoids 
unnecessary reactions to temporary fluctuations in the level of interest rates. This implies, 
for example, that the role currently assigned to the debt is proportionally larger than its 
actual cost, as in recent years interest rates have been particularly low. 
We also tried to further understand the impact of the 3% rule on the behaviour of fiscal 
policies in countries violating the threshold. In order to do so, we added the Maastricht 
variable  to  the  Eq.  [1a]  model.  In  this  context,  the  estimate  of  the  parameter  of  the 
Maastricht variable falls to 0.5 but it remains highly significant (with a t statistics of 3.2), 
suggesting that this variable contributes to better understanding the behaviour of countries in 
excessive deficit. Finally, we explored the possibility that the policies of the countries in 
excessive deficit changed between the period 1993-97 (fm 1993-97) and the following years 
(fm >1997), in view of the widespread idea that after 1998 the impact of the fiscal rules 
                                                           
18  This result is not surprising, as we found that the parameter for the debt, on the base of the average cost 
of the debt in the sample, was broadly consistent with a value of a parameter on interest payments equal to that 
estimated for the primary balance (see Section 4). 
19  In a model which includes all three variables, the p value of the null hypothesis that the overall balance 
has no additional impact on the dependent variable is 94.8%, while the p value of the null hypothesis that the 
primary balance and the debt have no additional impact is only 11.9%.     25 
weakened significantly. The point estimates, as well as more formal tests, do not suggest any 
differences in behaviour.
20 
6. The reactions to cyclical conditions 
As  seen  in  Table  1  of  Section  4,  controlling  for  other  factors  we  find  a  sizable 
stabilizing reaction of fiscal policies of the euro-area countries to cyclical conditions, as 
assessed at the time budgetary decisions were taken. A 1 per cent negative output gap in year 
t induces a budgetary loosening in year t+1 amounting to 0.4 per cent of GDP. We get a 
similar reaction if, in our model, we substitute the estimate of the output gap of year t with 
that of year t+1 (see Table A2). 
These results are in line with those of Forni and Momigliano (2004) and, partly, with 
those of Buti and van den Noord (2004),
21 while differ from the findings of various studies 
that, on the base of ex post data and generally referring to periods starting in the early 
seventies and ending in the late nineties, indicate that discretionary policies (in the euro area 
or in the EU) have been either a-cyclical or pro-cyclical (e.g. Buti and Sapir, 1998; Wyplosz, 
1999;  European  Commission,  2001;  Buti,  2002;  Brunila  and  Martinez-Mongay,  2002; 
Melitz, 2002; Galí and Perotti, 2003 and the studies referred to in European Commission, 
2006). The results of these studies have been generally taken as relevant for assessing the 
behaviour of fiscal authorities facing cyclical imbalances. However, as it is shown in Section 
8, the use of ex post data may largely explain these findings, at least for the last two decades. 
The sign of the reaction does not change across sub-periods (Table 2). The reaction is 
less strong in the 1993-97 period, but it is also not precisely estimated. As in Galí and Perotti 
(2003), we find evidence neither of the pro-cyclical bias that could stem from the Stability 
Pact  being  “all  sticks  and  no  carrots”  (Bean,  1998)  nor  of  the  “overall  improvement  in 
cyclical stabilization” with respect to the pre-Maastricht era, detected by Buti and Pench 
(2004). 
                                                           
20  If, starting from the base model, we split the Maastricht variable into two regressors, referring to the two 
sub-periods, their point estimates are, respectively, –0.6 and –0.82, with t statistics equal to 5.7 and 2.2. When 
we impose the same value to  the two parameters, the restriction is not rejected, with a p value of 57.2%. 
21  Buti and van den Noord (2004), examining the years 2000-03 and controlling for errors in forecasting, 
find that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical in the absence of elections.     26 
A number of recent papers have found an asymmetrical reaction of fiscal policy to 
cyclical conditions, depending on whether the latter are favourable or unfavourable (OECD, 
2003; Forni and Momigliano, 2004 and Balassone and Francese, 2004). These analyses have 
generally been based on models including two parameters (respectively, for the positive and 
negative  output  gaps)  for  the  reaction  of  fiscal  policy  to  cyclical  conditions.  Here  we 
consider a more general asymmetric behaviour, as we allow all parameters of our model to 
have two values, depending on whether the output gap is positive or negative.
22 
In Appendix 1 we show that the restrictions imposing symmetry (with respect to the 
sign of the gap) in country and time fixed-effects  are  largely  not rejected by data  and  that 
country effects can be altogether excluded by the model. Therefore, in this section we focus 
on two intermediate specifications (IM-BASE and IM-Eq. [1a]) which differ from our base 
and Eq. [1a] models, respectively, only because they allow the values of the other parameters 
(which measure the reactions to, respectively, the primary balance, the debt, the cyclical 
conditions and the elections) to be different, depending on the sign of the output gaps. 
The parameter estimates of these intermediate models and their level of significance 
are  shown  in  Table  3.  The  reaction  to  cyclical  conditions  x f   is  always  stabilizing, 
independently of the model or of the sign of the gap. In the base model, the size of the 
reaction  is  almost  identical  in  the  two  cyclical  contexts  (0.39  when  gaps  are  positive 
and 0.42 when they are negative) and the null hypothesis of symmetry cannot be rejected 
(with a p value of 91.4%). In the Eq. [1a] model, the difference in the point estimates is 
sizeable but it is also not significant (the p value for the hypothesis of symmetry is 34.3%). 
Furthermore, the counter-cyclical reaction is stronger in good times, while previous studies 
found the opposite result, indicating that in favourable economic conditions policies tended 
to be either pro-cyclical or a-cyclical.
23 
 
                                                           
22  For a non-parametric approach to this issue, see Manasse (2006). 
23  As an additional check on this issue we also examined two alternative approaches. The first involves 
estimating the base model (and the Eq. [1a] model) over two sub-samples, which include, respectively, only 
positive and only negative output gaps. Then a Chow test for parameter constancy is performed. The second 
approach, which is in line with previous analyses, involves a model with two parameters  x f (p) and  x f (n) 
(respectively,  for  the  positive  and  negative  output  gaps)  estimated  over  the  full  sample  and  a 
coefficient-equality test. In both cases, the null hypothesis of symmetry is largely not rejected.     27 
 
Table 3 
TESTING THE SIMMETRY, WITH RESPECT TO THE SIGN OF THE OUTPUT 
GAP, OF THE POLICY PARAMETERS 
 
    IM BASE MODEL    IM Eq. [1a] MODEL 
    estimated parameters 
(1)  symmetry 
tests 
(2)    estimated parameters 
(1)  symmetry 
tests 
(2) 
    if  gap > 0  if  gap < 0      if  gap > 0  if  gap < 0   
f
 
pb    –0.187 
***  –0.215 
**  77.8%    –0.196 
***  –0.261 
***  38.6% 
f
 
d    0.011 
***  0.009 
*  65.7%    0.014 
***  0.013 
***  86.6% 
f
 
x    0.393 
**  0.422 
**  91.4%    0.427 
**  0.224 
*  34.3% 
f
 
e1    –1.404 
***  0.128 
  1.7%    –1.381 
***  –0.045 
  0.6% 
f
 
e2    –0.592 
*  0.078 
  19.1%    –0.555 
*  –0.089 





e2     
      4.1%     
   
  1.9% 
fm    –0.619
 *   
-   
- No.of parameters    30      29   
- No.of observations   209      209   
- RMSE    1.132      1.147   
- R
2    0.383      0.362   
- R
2 adjusted    0.280      0.260   
 
(1) The estimates of 19 time-dummies are not reported. 
  The notations 
*, 
**, and 
*** indicate that parameters are, respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% 
significant. 
(2) p values of the tests of parameter equality. 
 
 
The difference in our results with respect to those of Forni and Momigliano (2004), 
which are directly comparable as they are also based on real-time information on cyclical 
conditions but point to a significant asymmetry in the reaction of fiscal policy, depends on 
three factors: (i) the different data used for the estimates of the output gap,
24 (ii) the inclusion 
among regressors, in our model, of the (asymmetric) effects of elections, and (iii) the use of 
                                                           
24  This result is not surprising. Orphanides and van Norden (2002) show that different methods to compute 
the output gap lead to significant differences in the results, especially when cyclical conditions are assessed in 
real time. Forni and Momigliano (2004) use, for the years 1995-2003, the estimates of output gaps published in 
the  OECD  EOs  and,  for  the  years  1993  and  1994,  the  estimates  of  the  output  gaps  implicit  in  the  EOs, 
approximately computed on the basis of the estimates of the cyclical component of the budget. In the period 
1993-2003 the number of positive output gaps in these estimates is limited (27 observations out of 121), which 
suggests caution in interpreting empirical inferences.     28 
real time information, again in our fiscal rule, on budget balances. In fact, if we estimate our 
base  model  over  their  sample  period  (1994-2004),  we  still  tend  to  largely  accept  the 
hypothesis of symmetry in the reactions to cyclical conditions, with a p value of the test of 
93.4%. If we substitute our real time estimates of the output gap and of the budget balances 
with  those  used  by  the  authors  and  exclude  elections  from  the  regressors,  symmetry  is 
rejected, with a p value of 3.3%. 
7. The role of the political budget cycle 
We find that regular elections (i.e., those held at the end of a full term) have a large 
impact on fiscal policies, provided that budgetary decisions are taken in a cyclical context 
assessed as favourable (i.e. the output gap is positive). Estimates based on our base model 
(Table 1, Section 4) indicate that, in this case, regular elections lead to a loosening of the 
fiscal stance of 1.4 per cent of GDP in the year in which they are held and of 0.6 per cent in 
the year before. These effects are relatively large, clearly on the high side of the empirical 
evidence (for a survey of the literature on political budget cycles see Drazen, 2001). The two 
election  parameters  are  jointly  highly  significant,  with  a  p value  of  0.2%  for  the  null 
hypothesis. 
In  contrast,  regular  elections  have  no  significant  effects  on  fiscal  policies  if  the 
budgetary decisions are taken when the output gap is negative (see Table 3, Section 6). In 
particular, in the test of joint significance, the p value of the hypothesis of no effects exceeds 
95% (row IM4, Table A1.2). 
Other studies have provided evidence of electoral manipulation of fiscal policy in EU 
countries (Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002; Buti, 2002; von Hagen, 2002 and Buti and van den 
Noord,  2003).  Evidence  that  the  cyclical  context  has  an  impact  on  the  extent  of  these 
manipulations for the euro-area can already be found in Buti and van den Noord (2004). This 
previous evidence, however, refers only to four years (2000-03) and to pre- or early election 
years.  Here  we  broadly  confirm  and  substantially  extend  those  results,  as  we  find  a 
preminent role of the cyclical context over almost two decades in determining fiscal policies 
both in pre- and in election years. 
The importance of the cyclical conditions has, in our opinion, a plausible explanation, 
in line with the models of political budget cycles which emphasize temporary information     29 
asymmetries  (e.g.  Rogoff  and  Siebert,  1988).  In  good  times,  policymakers  can  provide 
additional public goods to the electorate while signalling, with a relatively low (unadjusted) 
deficit, that they are good administrators. This behaviour is not possible in adverse economic 
conditions,  as  the  automatic  stabilizers  and  the  counter-cyclical  action  already  raise  the 
deficit and leave no room for providing additional public goods. If correct, this explanation 
implies that, at least in the euro-area, improving information on cyclical conditions and on 
their  impact  on  budget  balances  would  help  to  reduce  electoral  manipulations  of  fiscal 
policy. 
As the euro-area countries are essentially established democracies, our results contrast 
with those of Brender and Drazen (2004), who find that electoral budget cycles are confined 
to new democracies.
25 
When we split the sample into sub-periods (Table 2), a general pattern emerges. The 
estimates  of  the  two  parameters  for  the  sub-periods  1988-92  and  1998-2006  are  always 
negative (i.e., the effects are deficit-increasing), relatively stable across periods and, in the 
case of  1 e f
p, always highly significant. In the period 1993-97 there are so few elections that 
the results cannot be considered reliable. 
On the issue of measuring the electoral variables, other authors have proposed more 
complex alternatives to the yearly dummies we use. In Table 4 we compare our results with 
those obtained with two of these alternatives. As benchmark, for comparability with other 
studies, we show the estimates of a slight variant of our base model (BASE-early), which 
also includes a parameter for early elections ( 3 e
p f ). 
Franzese (2000) defines an electoral variable equal, in the year t (that of the election), 
to the number of the month in which the election is held divided by 12 and, in the year 
before elections, to its complement to 1. In the column “MONTH” of Table 4 we present the 
estimates  of  a  specification  which,  compared  to  our  base  model,  excludes  our  regular 
elections dummies (with the corresponding parameters f 
p
e1 and f 
p
e2)  and includes the 
corresponding variables proposed by the author (parameters f 
p
e1 with month and f 
p
e2 with 
month).  As  with our model,  we set  to zero the variable if  budgetary decisions  are taken in 
                                                           
25  In our sample only the elections in 1989 in Spain refer, in Brender and Drazen therminology, to “new 
democracies”. Excluding that episode (an early election), does not significantly modify our results.     30 
 
Table 4 
RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
OF THE ELECTORAL VARIABLES
(1) 
 
PARAMETER  BASE-early  MONTH  QUARTER 
fpb  –0.190  –0.191  –0.218 
  –4.33  –4.35  –4.84 
fd  0.010  0.011  0.011 
  2.95  3.01  3.10 
fm  –0.619  –0.619  –0.619 
  –6.09  –6.08  –6.14 
fx  0.422  0.392  0.428 
  3.78  3.55  3.79 
f
 (p)
e1  –1.413     
  –4.27     
f
 (p)
e2  –0.594    –0.577 
  –1.90    –1.86 
f
 (p)
e1 month    –2.536   
    –4.05   
f
 (p)
e2 month    –0.954   
    –1.98   
f
 (p)
e1 for Q1      –1.464 
      –2.67 
f
 (p)
e1 for Q2      –0.963 
      –2.00 
f
 (p)
e1 for Q3      –4.142 
      –3.43 
f
 (p)
e1 for Q4      –1.219 
      –1.73 
f
 (p)
e3  –0.423  –0.402  –0.455 
  –1.18  –1.12  –1.28 
No. of observations  209  209  209 
Root Mean Squared Error  1.117  1.120  1.108 
R
2  0.385  0.382  0.405 
R
2 adjusted  0.298  0.294  0.310 
 
(1) T statistics are reported below the estimates. The estimates for the time-dummies are not 
reported.     31 
 
bad times (the results of the comparison are not modified if we allow the effects of elections 
to be symmetric  in all the models).  The estimates  for the parameters  of the latter  variables 
(for both sides of the table) are in line with our results, taking into account that the mean and 
the median of the ratio between the election month and 12 in our sample is slightly above 
0.5, but do not seem to add relevant information. More formally, there is no evidence of any 
of the two models being superior to the other, as both are valid reductions from a general 
model in which they are nested.
26 
Mink and de Haan (2005) split the electoral variable for the year t into four variables 
dependent  on  the  quarter  in  which  the  election  is  held,  to  capture  a  non-monotonic 
relationship.  In  the  column  “QUARTER”  we  present  the  parameter  estimates  using  this 
specification.
27 The evidence of statistical differences between their values and that of the 
yearly parameter f
 (p)
e1 is mixed, as the p value of the joint hypothesis of no differences is 
11.4%. Examining individual quarters, only the effects of elections held in the third quarter 
are  significantly  different  (larger)  than  those  in  the  other  quarters.  This  time  pattern  is 
broadly consistent with that found by Mink and de Haan (2005), who detect a peak in the 
effect for the elections held in the middle of the year. 
Overall, we tend to conclude that, in the euro-area context, there is not any mechanical 
correlation between  the  magnitude  of  the budgetary effects  and the month  in  which  the 
election is held, but there is some evidence that elections held in the third quarter do exert a 
larger expansionary impact on the deficit than those carried out in the other quarters.
28 
Finally, the choice of electoral variables does not affect the estimates of the other 
parameters. 
                                                           
26  In a model which includes all four variables, the p value of the null hypothesis that our two dummies 
have no additional impact on the dependent variable is 56.2%, while the p value of the null hypothesis that 
Franzese variable has no additional impact is 58.2%. 
27  Here, to facilitate the interpretation of the values of the coefficients and comparability with our results, 
we present estimates where the yearly dummy is split into four quarterly parameters, while Mink and de Haan 
(2005) start, in fact, from Franzese electoral variable. Results for the model based on their original specification 
for the quarterly variables are close to those presented here. In particular, the overall explanatory power is 
similar and the estimates of the four parameters are, approximately, proportional to the product of those shown 
in column “QUARTER” and the ratio between 12 and the middle month of each quarter. The t statistics of the 
parameter  of  the  electoral  variable  for  the  year  before  the  elections  increases  slightly  and  becomes  5% 
significant. 
28  This result seems to require a different explanation from that proposed by Mink and de Haan (2005), 
based on information lags concerning the public sector borrowing, as that is inconsistent with the presence of a 
not-irrelevant impact of elections on fiscal policies in the year before the one in which they are held.     32 
8. The effects on estimates of using ex post data 
As mentioned in the Introduction, most empirical estimates of fiscal rules have used ex 
post (latest available) data. If the estimated parameters are interpreted as identifying the 
behaviour of policy-makers, the use of data which could not possibly have been used by the 
latter entails the risk of a biased assessment. 
It should be noted that even if only one explanatory variable is measured with error 
(depending on the use of ex post – revised – data in models where real-time information 
matters), all parameter estimates are biased. If there are more variables measured with error 
(as in our case, where all explanatory variables would have to be measured on the basis of 
real-time data) the expressions of the biases get very complicated. The direction of the bias 
on the coefficients is determined by: (i) the model parameters, (ii) the correlations between 
the variables (measured without error, i.e. real-time) and (iii) the ratios of the revisions’ 
variances  to  the  respective  variances  of  the  true  (i.e.  real  time)  variables,  see  e.g.  Levi 
(1973). 
The risks of biased estimates could be limited if the revisions were small. However, it 
is  well  known  that  the  initial  assessment  of  the  cyclical  conditions  is  subject  to  large 
revisions over time. This is, in part, due to the error in assessing growth in the current year 
but, more importantly, depends on the fact that the estimate of the output gap for a given 
year  is  crucially  tied  to  the  growth  of  GDP  in  the  following  periods,  which  is  usually 
forecasted  with  large  errors.  In  the  case  of  fiscal  data,  the  initial  assessment  for  some 
countries has been also significantly modified in recent years, as the application of some 
methodological  criteria  has  been  clarified  by  Eurostat  and/or  corrected  by  National 
Statistical Institutions and new information has become available.
29 
In order to quantitatively assess the extent to which the use of ex post data can modify 
the estimates, at least in our sample, Table 5 shows the comparison between our results and 
those  obtained  using  the  latest  available  information  (from  the  OECD  December  2005 
Economic Outlook). Overall, it indicates that the type of information set used has a large 
impact on estimates. 
                                                           
29  From 1998 to 2005, public deficits of the euro-area countries were above the Maastricht Treaty limit 
(3% of GDP) 12 times with real-time data and  24 times on the basis of the latest available information.     33 
The first column of the table shows the OLS estimates based on real-time data for a 
slight variant of our base model, in which we allow elections to exert different effects in the 
positive  and  in  the  negative  cyclical  phases.
30  In  addition,  since  ex  post  data  embody 
revisions that may not average to zero within countries over time, we start with a model with 
both country and time effects. As in our base model, individual effects are not significant 
(and are therefore excluded by the model on which the reported estimates are based), while 
time effects are, and election effects are significant only during the positive cyclical phases. 
Point estimates and significance levels of all other parameters are almost identical to those of 
the base model. 
In the second column we report the OLS estimates of the same model but using ex post 
data for the output gaps. Results are generally broadly similar to those of the first column but 
without the asymmetry in the effects of elections dependent on the sign of the output gap. 
Furthermore,  the  counter-cyclical  reaction  is  significantly  smaller  and  is  only  10% 
significant. Finally, the overall explanatory power of the model is reduced. 
In the third and fourth columns of Table 5 we report OLS and GMM estimates of the 
same model using ex post data not only for the output gaps but also for the budget balances. 
We also use GMM (following the proposal of Arellano and Bond, 1991) as, in this case, 
country  effects  are  statistically  significant  and,  therefore,  they  are  included  in  the 
specification on which the reported estimates are based. Not being significant,  time effects 
were excluded. While the results in the third and fourth column are broadly similar (except 
for the parameter of the Maastricht variable), almost all estimates are significantly different 
from those based on real-time data and the explanatory power of the models drops further. 
9. Conclusions 
This paper examines the impact of four major factors on the fiscal policies of the 
euro-area countries over the last two decades. We rely on information actually available to 
policy-makers  at  the  time  of  budgeting  in  constructing  our  explanatory  variables.  A 
parsimonious model, which does not include fixed effects for individual countries, is able to  
                                                           
30  Given that measuring the output gap with ex post data may alter the identification of positive and 
negative cyclical phases, it is not granted a priori that elections play an asymmetric role with ex post data too. 
For this reason, we prefer to start from a more general framework.     34 
 
Table 5 
COMPARING RESULTS WITH REAL-TIME AND EX POST DATA
(1) (2) 
 
  Real-time data  Ex post data for 
cyclical conditions 
Ex post data for cyclical conditions 
and primary balance 
  OLS 
(3)  OLS 
(3)  OLS 
(4)  GMM 
(4), (5) 
fpb  –0.193  –0.181  –0.348  –0.318 
  –4.36  –3.98  –6.81  –7.62 
fd  0.011  0.011  0.023  0.012 
  3.02  2.96  3.55  3.92 
fm  –0.619  –0.619  –0.634  –1.154 
  –6.05  –5.89  –5.55  –6.61 
fx  0.426  0.197  0.098  0.114 
  3.69  1.83  1.41  1.87 
f
 (p)
e1  –1.367  –0.976  –0.563  –0.615 
  –4.13  –2.62  –1.56  –1.80 
f
 (n)
e1  0.030  –0.790  –0.289  –0.408 
  0.06  –1.84  –0.73  –1.21 
f
 (p)
e2  –0.551  –0.181  –0.125  –0.253 
  –1.76  –0.57  –0.36  –0.78 
f
 (n)
e1  –0.024  –0.651  –0.190  –0.195 
  –0.07  –1.62  –0.52  –0.58 
Joint significance (p values)       
Individual effects  41.4%  43.4%  0.7%  - 
Time effects  2.2%  6.2%  76.5%  26.6% 
Elections effects  0.2%  2.3%  56.0%  30.2% 
Main diagnostics:         
N. of observations  209  209  209  209 
RMSE
(6)  1.124  1.156  1.150  1.215 
R
2  0.381  0.345  0.323
(7)  0.241 
R
2 adjusted  0.289  0.248  0.256
(7)  0.214 
Hansen J
(8)  -  -  -  15.1% 
Autocorrelation
(9)  12.4%  7.9%  96.2%  62.3% 
 
(1) T statistics are reported below the estimates. The estimates of the individual and 
time-dummies are not reported. 
(2) Base  model  plus  generalised  (i.e.  positive  and  negative)  election  parameters. 
Deterministic components are estimated when significant (see notes below). 
(3) As  a  result  of  parameter  tests,  the  model  allows  for  time  effects  and  does  not 
include country fixed effects. 
(4) As a result of parameter tests, the model allows for country fixed effects and does 
not include time effects. 
(5) Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM-diff estimator. 
(6) Root Mean Squared Error. 
(7) Based on the squared coefficient of correlation between actual and fitted values. 
(8) Hansen (1982) overidentification test. 
(9) First-order residual autocorrelation for OLS, second order for GMM.     35 
 
explain almost 40 per cent of the variability of budgetary actions between countries and over 
time.  The  tests  for  parameter  constancy  over  the  three  sub-periods  1988-92,  1993-97, 
1998-2006 do not identify any structural breaks. Our estimates indicate that: 
·  Fiscal policies reacted to the levels of the primary balance and of the debt in a stabilizing 
manner: the coefficient of the primary balance indicates that, ceteris paribus, one fifth of 
the imbalance is corrected in the following year, while the reaction to the debt is equal to 
1 per cent of the outstanding stock.  
·  European fiscal rules play a somewhat limited role in our model. The point estimates 
of the reactions to primary balance and debt levels are higher for the sub-period 1993-97, 
but this increase is not statistically significant and it is temporary: the estimates for the 
following  period  (1998-2006)  are  in  line  with  those  for  the  pre-Maastricht  years 
(1988-92). We also find that the behaviour of the countries with excessive deficits is 
moreaccurately captured throughout the period 1993-2006 by a specifically constructed 
regressor, defined on the basis of the European rules. However, the exclusion of this 
variable leaves the overall explanatory power of the model and the parameter estimates 
broadly unchanged. Overall, we conclude that the European fiscal rules only reaffirmed 
preferences that can already be detected in the years immediately preceding the Treaty of 
Maastricht. It is possible, however, that those preferences would have not remained stable 
without the Treaty. 
·  The reaction of the fiscal authorities to cyclical conditions has generally been stabilizing 
and not negligeable: a 1 per cent negative output gap leads to a budgetary loosening of 0.4 
per cent of GDP. This result differs from the findings of most empirical analyses, which 
find on the basis of ex post data and referring to periods including earlier years that the 
normal response of euro-area fiscal policies to cyclical developments has been in general 
either a-cyclical or pro-cyclical. The type of information set used seems a crucial element 
in explaining the different results. If we replicate our analysis using the latest available 
(ex post) information for our regressors, the estimated reaction becomes smaller and not 
significant. 
·  The results for the response to cyclical conditions have some implications for the current 
debate on fiscal rules and policies. First, as well as Galí and Perotti (2003), we do not 
observe  the  pro-cyclical  bias  that  could  stem  from  the  Stability  Pact  (Bean,  1998). 
Second,  taking  into  account  that  the  counter-cyclical  reaction  comes  on  top  of  the     36 
working of the automatic stabilizers, there is probably little need to modify fiscal rules in 
order to induce governments to seek greater stabilization as suggested, for example, in 
Bruck and Zwiener (2006). Finally, the results based on ex post information suggest that 
actual stabilization carried out by the governments (which is particularly important for the 
euro area, not only because of the centralization of monetary and exchange policies, but 
also  owing  to  the  limited  geographical  mobility  of  labour  and  to  wage  flexibility; 
cfr. Feldstein,  2005)  would  be  enhanced  by  improving  the  real-time  assessment  of 
cyclical conditions. 
·  When  we  distinguish  between  favourable  and  adverse  cyclical  conditions  there  is  no 
evidence of the asymmetry in the policy response that some recent studies found. 
·  We  find  strong  evidence  for  the  existence  of  a  political  budget  cycle,  but  the  fiscal 
loosening associated with elections (1.4 per cent of GDP in the year in which they are 
held and 0.6 per cent in the year before) is present only if cyclical conditions are assessed 
as favourable when the relevant budgetary decisions are taken. The tentative explanation 
we offer for this pattern suggests that improving information on cyclical conditions and 
on their impact on budget balances would help to reduce electoral manipulations of fiscal 
policy. It is noteworthy that the evidence of a political budget cycle tends to disappear 
when we use the latest available (ex post) information for our regressors. 
·  The  results  are  robust  to  alternative  measures  of  the  dependent  variable  and  of  the 
regressors, and to the exclusion of any country, in turn, from the sample. In particular, the 
estimate of the response of fiscal policies to cyclical developments is almost unaffected 
by the imposition that the effects of elections be constant across good and bad times. 
·  Many of our results do not carry over when we apply the same model to a group of 8 
OECD countries outside the area. 
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Table 6 
ELECTION DATABASE (FROM 1987 TO 2007): 
YEAR (MONTH) R=REGULAR, E=EARLY 
 
United States of America: 1988(11)R, 1992(11)R, 1996(11)R, 2000(11)R, 2004(11)R 
Japan: 1990(2)R, 1993(7)E, 1996(10)E, 2000(6)R, 2003(11)E, 2005(9)E 
Germany: 1987(1)R, 1990(12)E, 1994(10)R, 1998(9)R, 2002(9)R, 2005(9)E 
France: 1988(6)E, 1993(3)R, 1997(5)E, 2002(4)R, 2007(4)R 
Italy: 1987(4)E, 1992(4)R, 1994(3)E, 1996(4)E, 2001(5)R, 2006(4)R 
United Kingdom: 1987(6)R, 1992(4)R, 1997(5)R, 2001(6)R, 2005(5)R 
Canada: 1988(10)E, 1993(10)R, 1997(6)E, 2000(11)E, 2004(6)E 
Australia: 1987(7)E, 1990(3)E, 1993(3)R, 1996(3)R, 1998(10)E, 2001(11)R, 2004(10)R, 2007(11)R 
Austria: 1990(1)R, 1994(1)R, 1995(12)E, 1999(10)E, 2002(11)E, 2006(11)E 
Belgium: 1987(12)E, 1991(11)R, 1995(5)R, 1999(6)R, 2003(5)R, 2007(5)R 
Denmark: 1987(9)R, 1988(5)E, 1990(12)E, 1994(9)R, 1998(3)R, 2001(11)R, 2005(2)R 
Finland: 1987(3)R, 1991(3)R, 1995(3)R, 1999(3)R, 2003(3)R, 2007(3)R 
Greece: 1989(9)R, 1993(10)R, 1996(9)E, 2000(4)R, 2004(3)R  
Ireland: 1987(2)R, 1989(6)E, 1992(11)E, 1997(6)R, 2002(5)R, 2007(6)R 
Netherlands: 1989(9)E, 1994(5)R, 1998(5)R, 2002(5)R, 2003(1)E, 2007(5)R 
New Zealand: 1987(7)R, 1990(7)R, 1993(11)R, 1996(10)R, 1999(11)R, 2002(7)R, 2005(7)R 
Portugal: 1987(7)E, 1991(10)R, 1995(10)R, 1999(10)R, 2002(3)E, 2005(2)E 
Spain: 1989(10)E, 1993(6)R, 1996(3)E, 2000(3)R, 2004(3)R 
Sweden: 1988(9)E, 1991(9)E, 1994(9)E, 1998(9)R, 2002(9)R, 2006(9)R 




FROM THE GENERAL TO THE BASE MODEL 
 
In this Appendix we provide a detailed description of the process of reduction from a 
general unrestricted model (GUM) to our base model and from a general model which does 
not include the Maastricht variable (GUM-Eq. [1a]) to the Eq. [1a] model. 
Preliminarily,  we  perform  on  the  GUMs  (GUM  and  GUM-Eq.  [1a])  a  number  of 
specification tests. Results are shown in Table A1.1. In detail, the upper half of the table 
shows the results of a few specification tests to the GMM estimates of the GUMs and of the 
comparison between the latter and the estimates based on OLS. In the lower part we analyse 
the statistical properties of the residuals obtained with OLS. 
Then we assess the restrictions which enable us to move from the general unrestricted 
model to, respectively, the base and the Eq. [1a] models. This analysis performed for all 
restrictions  at  once  and,  for  greater  transparency,  also  for  homogeneous  groups  of 
restrictions (Table A1.2). In particular, we assess the sets of restrictions which enable us to 
move to two intermediate models, IM-BASE and IM-Eq. [1a], which differ from the final 
ones  (base  and  Eq.  [1a]  model)  only  for  the  fact  that  they  allow  the  values  of  policy 
parameters  to  vary  depending  on  the  sign  of  the  output  gaps.  The  estimates  for  these 
intermediate models are shown in the main text in Table 3. 
Validation of the GUMs 
In order to decrease the impact on parameter estimates of biases due to possible model 
specification errors in the GUMs, we allow for country and time effects. The country effects 
should account for the influence of almost time-invariant omitted variables, and the time 
effects should allow for a degree of dependency across individuals due to common factors 
(individual-invariant  omitted  variables).  It  is  widely  acknowledged  that  the  presence  of 
individual effects in dynamic panel models implies that the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated to the equation error. In this context, the approach proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991),  involving  the  GMM  applied  to  differenced  data,  delivers  consistent  parameter 
estimates.  Nevertheless,  we  prefer  to  use  OLS  estimators,  especially  for  the  restricted 
models, for a number of reasons.     39 
First, in our analysis two factors should limit the risk of biases of the OLS estimator. 
The different nature of data – cyclically-adjusted ex post data for the dependent variable 
Dcapbit and unadjusted real-time data for the explanatory primary balance pbit–1 – should 
weaken the endogeneity problem of the regressor. Moreover,  the size of the bias should be 
limited, as it is inversely proportional to the time dimension of the sample, which in our case 
is relatively large (19 years). In this context, the OLS bias may be more than offset by its 
greater precision compared to GMM estimator (see Nickell, 1981; Judson and Owen, 1999; 
and Attanasio et al., 2000). 
Second, estimates of OLS over GMM can be formally compared with the Hausman 
(1978) test. As the test does not rejects the null, suggesting OLS and GMM (in differences) 
estimates are equivalent, OLS estimates are advisable, being more efficient. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the country effects, though on the basis of OLS 
estimates, can be restricted to zero (see the following section of this Appendix) and in this 
context the OLS method delivers consistent parameter estimates. 
As a check preliminary to performing the Hausman (1978) test, we assess the estimates 
of the GUMs with the GMM-differences approach proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
The main diagnostics are laid out in the upper panel of Table A1.1. The absence of second-
order  residual  autocorrelation  suggests  well  behaved  residuals,  while  the  presence  of 
first-order autocorrelation is simply due to data transformation in first-differences. Hansen 
(1982) J-test does not reject, at lest at the 1% level, the over-identification restrictions (i.e. 
the choice of the instruments). 
The lower part of Table A1.1 reports the main tests on residuals with OLS, namely: 
White (1980) and Breusch and Pagan (1980) tests for heteroskedasticity, Ramsey (1969) 
specification  error  test,  Bhargava  et  al.  (1982)  Durbin-Watson-type,  Wooldridge  (2002, 
pp. 282-83) and Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation. 
In addition, Godfrey (1988) LM-type tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation are 
reported  for  OLS  estimates  without  fixed  individual  effects  (i.e.,  only  for  base  and 
intermediate models). The residual diagnostics are reported not just for the GUMs but also 
for  the  intermediate  models  (IMs)  and  for  the  final  models.  In  general,  the  models 
performance  is  in  line  with  the  hypothesis  of  well-behaved  residuals;  hence,  parameter 
inferences can be drawn on the basis of OLS estimator statistical distributions. 
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Validation of the restrictions 
Table A1.2 presents the results of the tests on the restrictions which allow to move 
from the GUMs to our intermediate models (IM-BASE and IM-Eq. [1a]) and to our final 
specifications (base and Eq. [1a]) discussed in the main text. 
 
Table A1.1 
GUM AND BASE MODELS MISSPECIFICATION TESTS AND DIAGNOSTICS 
 
  Equations [1a]–[1b]  Equation [1a] 
Residual and specification tests of GMM estimates 
GMM AR1 p values  0.8%  2% 
GMM AR2 p values  8.8%  24.5% 
Hansen J p values  1.5%  8.0% 
Hausman statistic, c
2  48.3  60.3 
- degrees of freedom
(1)  61  45 
- p values  88.1%  6.4% 
Analisis of GUM, IM and base model OLS estimates 
Residual tests:  GUM  IM  BASE  GUM[1a]  IM[1a]  Eq. [1a] 
- White p values  46.7%  70.7%  31.0%  44.7%  93.1%  56.6% 
- Breusch-Pagan p values  65.4%  93.6%  97.9%  81.5%  90.6%  99.0% 
- Ramsey RESET p values  0.1%  49.8%  46.7%  7.4%  7.1%  6.6% 
- Bhargava et al Durbin-Watson  2.38  2.25  2.24  2.51  2.25  2.25 
- Wooldridge, AR1 p values  5.6%  5.1%  10.9%  0.8%  2.7%  2.9% 
- Arellano-Bond, AR2 p values  35.5%  13.9%  17.5%  47.1%  13.1%  12.3% 
- Godfrey LM, AR1 p values    5.4%  6.4%    5.7%  5.7% 
- Godfrey LM, AR2 p values    14.9%  16.6%    16.4%  16.3% 
Other diagnostics: 
- Number of parameters  91  30  25  66  29  24 
- Number of observations  209  209  209  209  209  209 
- RMSE  1.118  1.132  1.118  1.162  1.147  1.141 
- R
2  0.603  0.383  0.381  0.480  0.362  0.352 
- R
2 adjusted  0.297  0.280  0.297  0.240  0.260  0.268 
 
(1)  Number of parameters in GUMs (see below), excluding the individual effects.     41 
 
The upper part of Table A1.2 (rows 1-10) is devoted to test restrictions that imply a 
switch from equation [1a] to equation [1b] when the Maastricht variable mit–1 is negative (see 
Section  2).  This  dichotomic  representation  requires  that  all  parameter  estimates  of 
equation [1a] be not significantly different from zero when mit–1 is negative. The tests of 
these 25 restrictions are shown in row 8 of Table A1.2. Since the GUM allows for different 
fm parameters for the run-up to Maastricht (1993-97) and for the post-1998 period, we also 
test the restriction that the two parameters are equal (row 9). 
On the basis of the large p value reported in row (10), the 26 restrictions that allow to 
simplify the GUM into the dichotomic representation [1a]–[1b]  (i.e. mit–1 < 0), cannot be 
rejected. 
In row 11, we present the results of the test on whether it is admissible to restrict to 
zero the effects of the German unification, a captured by dummies for the years 1990-94. 
The GUMs allow the possibility of asymmetry, depending on the sign of the output gap, both 
in  country  and  time  fixed-effects  and  in  explicit  policy  parameters  (which  measure  the 
reactions to, respectively, the output gap, the initial conditions of public finances and the 
coming elections). Rows 12 and 13 of Table A1.2 show the results of tests examining the 
restrictions  which  impose  symmetry  in  the  country  and  time  effects,  respectively.  The 
overall test of row 14, for both the GUM and the GUM-Eq. [1a], suggests that the null 
hypothesis of no German unification effects and of symmetry in country and time effects 
cannot be rejected. Therefore, the German unification dummies can be excluded from the 
specifications and the two sets of, respectively, country and time effects can be unified. 
In  lines  15 and  16  we test  the  relevance  of  (symmetric) country  and time  effects. 
Individual effects are largely not significant, while the overall relevance of time dummies is 
relatively less clear. To assess the latter, we prefer referring to the p values in row (IM1), 
where only 19 restrictions are tested (against the intermediate specifications IM-BASE and 
IM-Eq. [1a]), and to reject the null hypothesis of zero time effects. 
Therefore, on  the basis  of  the  finding just  mentioned,  we  are  able  to  simplify  the 
starting  GUMs  by  imposing  the  63  and  37  non-rejected  restrictions  in  row  (17)  to, 
respectively, the GUM and the GUM-Eq. [1a]. On the basis of the resulting intermediate 
models  (IM  and  IM-Eq.  [1a])  in  Section  6  (Table  3)  we  examine  the  issue  of 
asymmetry/symmetry in policy actions, depending on whether the output gaps are favourable 
or adverse.    42 
 
Table A1.2 
FROM GENERAL TO RESTRICTED MODELS, 
TESTS ON COEFFICIENT RESTRICTIONS 
(p values of the tests) 
 
  From GUM   
Tests of irrelevance of other factors if mit < 0     
(1) no country effects   44.2%   
(2) no time effects  85.1%   
(3) no country and time effects = (1+2)  73.2%   
(4) no output gap effects  74.6%   
(5) no primary balance and debt effects  98.6%   
(6) no election effects  57.0%   
(7) no (4 + 5+ 6) effects  91.7%   
(8) no country, time and policy effects = (3+7)  83.0%   
(9) fm constancy  70.1%   
(10) All restrictions above  85.0%   
    From 
GUM Eq. [1a]  Test of irrelevance of German unification dummies
(1)     
(11) no effects of German unification dummies
(1)  84.4%  52.7% 
Tests of symmetry w.r.t. the sign of the output gap
(1)     
(12) symmetry in country effects
(1)   26.3%  40.4% 
(13) symmetry in time effects
(1)  85.0%  69.7% 
(14) All the restrictions above
(1)  37.1%  56.1% 
(15) no (symmetric) country effects
(1)  31.8%  54.1% 
(16) no (symmetric) time effects
(1)  46.1%  13.2% 
(17) Test of restrictions from GUMs to the Intermediate models: restrictions 
(14+15) 
(2)  37.7%  67.3% 
(18) Restrictions (14) and no time effects (16)  11.8%  12.4% 
     
(19) Test of restrictions imposed on Final models: restrictions (17+IM2)
(3)  46.3%  66.0% 
  From IM-BASE  From IM-Eq. [1a] 
Further tests, starting from Intermediate Models      
(IM1) no time effects  1.7%  2.2% 
(IM2) symmetry (w.r.t. the sign of the output gap) in output gap, primary balance 
and debt effects   89.9%  45.5% 
(IM3) symmetry (w.r.t. the sign of the output gap) in election effects  4.1%  1.9% 
(IM4) no effects of elections if the output gap <0  96.0%  95.9% 
 
(1) The following tests include, for the first column, all the restrictions in row 10. 
(2) The  null  hypothesis  of  these  restrictions  identifies  in  the  first  and  in  the  second 
column, respectively, the IM-BASE and the IM-Eq. [1a] model; their parameter 
estimates are reported in Table 3. 
(3) The  null  hypothesis  of  these  restrictions  identifies  in  the  first  and  in  the  second 
column, respectively, the BASE and the Eq. [1a] models; their parameter estimates 
are reported in Table 1.     43 
 
Here,  summarizing  the  results  of  Section  6,  we  show  that  the  joint  test  on  the 
symmetry of policy reactions to output gaps, primary balance and debt effects (row IM2) are 
largely not rejected, while that on the symmetry of the policy reactions to elections is clearly 
rejected. Moreover, in the case of elections, their effects when the gaps are negative are not 
significant  and  can  be  excluded  (row  IM4).  Overall,  the  reduction  from  GUMs  to  the 
corresponding  specifications,  base  and  Eq.  [1a]  model,  respectively  implies  67  and  44 




OTHER ROBUSTNESS EXERCISES 
 
In this section we test the robustness of our estimates to the timing and measurement 
of the output gap and to the exclusion of any single country of our sample. In the main text, 
additional evidence of robustness has been provided: in Table 1 for alternative samples of 
countries (outside the euro area), in Table 2 for different periods of time, and in Table 4 
using alternative elections’ indicators. 
Robustness to the timing and measurement of the output gap 
Given the relevance of the role played by the output gap in our modelling strategy (it is 
both a regressor of the base model and the variable governing the cyclical phases), it is 
important to assess the robustness of our results with respect to alternatives involving this 
variable. As far as timing is concerned, in our base model we assume that policymakers react 
to the current cyclical conditions (xt–1), i.e. existing at time the policy is set, but they may 
plausibly react to the conditions expected for the following year (xt). In this case, because of 
the simultaneity of the explanatory output gap, the base model parameters must be estimated 
with  instrumental  variables  (IV)  rather  than  using  OLS.  As  for  alternative  output  gap 
measures,  we  use:  that  obtained  by  filtering  GDP  real  time  data  with  the  traditional 
Holdrick-Prescott  approach  instead  of  Mohr’s,  and  that  reported  in  the  OECD  EO.  A 
drawback with the EO measure is the reduced number of observations available (only since 
1993, see Section 3). 
Estimation results of all the robustness exercises about the output gap described above 
are  reported  in  Table  A2.  In  particular,  in  the  first  column  (BASE(xt–1))  we  report  the 
benchmark estimates of the base model over the period 1988-2006. In the second column 
(IV) the instrumental-variable estimate of the base model is reported. The (simultaneous) 
output gap at time t is instrumented with its lagged values. 
It  is  well  known  that  the  performance  of  estimators  exploiting  instrumental 
information crucially depends on the relevance of the instruments in question, that is, on the 
correlation  between  the  instruments  and  the  endogenous  explanatory  variables.  In  finite 
samples, low instrument relevance (“weak instruments”) can lead both to biased estimators     45 
and to the departure of their distribution from the asymptotic normal. In order to check for 
instrument relevance, we performed the Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) F statistic to test the 
null hypothesis that the lagged output gap is weak. The first-stage F-statistic in our case 
(27.9) is well above the 5% critical value (8.96, see Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002, Table 1, 
p. 522), and leads to the rejection of the null. 
In  the  third  column  (HP),  the  output  gap  is  measured  by  the  traditional 
Holdrick-Prescott-filtered GDP. In the case presented here, we set to 100 the smoothing 




ROBUSTNESS TO ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF CYCLICAL CONDITIONS
(1) 
 
  1988-2006  1994-2006 
  BASE (xt–1)  IV (xt)  HP (xt–1)  BASE(xt–1)  OECD(xt–1) 
fpb  –0.192  –0.180  –0.223  –0.189  –0.223 
  –4.39  –4.11  –4.66  –2.59  –2.76 
fd  0.011  0.009  0.014  0.008  0.009 
  3.03  2.46  3.57  1.50  1.34 
fm  –0.619  –0.619  –0.619  –0.653  –0.653 
  –6.09  –6.05  –5.97  –6.21  –6.12 
fx  0.427  0.553  0.489  0.421  0.203 
  3.82  3.29  3.61  3.16  2.16 
f
 (p
e1  –1.366  –1.258  –1.153  –1.153  –1.094 
  –4.16  –3.42  –3.14  –3.09  –2.50 
f
 (p)
e2  –0.551  –0.728  –0.139  –0.791  –1.339 
  –1.77  –2.21  –0.47  –1.94  –2.41 
           
N. of observ.  209  209  209  143  143 
RMSE 
(2)  1.118  1.126  1.140  1.021  1.037 
R
2  0.381  0.355 
(3)  0.356  0.410  0.391 
R
2 adjusted  0.297  0.267 
(3)  0.269  0.319  0.298 
 
(1)  The t statistics are reported below the estimates. The estimates of the time-dummies 
are not reported. 
(2)  Root Mean Squared Error. 
(3)  Generalised R
2, see Pesaran and Smith (1994). 
Model 
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In order to ease comparisons, columns four and five of Table A2 report alternative 
estimates  of  the  base  model  over  the  common  sample  1994-2006,  given  the  limited 
availability of OECD’s output gap data. The fourth column reports estimates based on our 
data set, while the fifth column shows results based on the estimates of the output gap of the 
OECD (OECD). 
These  robustness  experiments  confirm  our  base  model  findings,  pointing  to  the 
asymmetry  of  the  election  effects  and  to  significant,  and  symmetric,  counter-cyclical 
policies. Across the first three columns, the expansionary effect of elections in the same year 
they are held is quantitatively similar, while there is some variability for the effect of the 
elections held in the previous year. 
In the last two columns of Table A2, notwithstanding the reduced dimension of the 
sample, our results generally confirm the estimation results of the base model. However, in 
the last column the reaction to cyclical conditions is lower (but still significant) and the 
effect of the elections in the year before that in which they are held is higher. 
Robustness in euro-area subsamples 
We estimated our base model on the basis of eleven alternative samples obtained by 
excluding one country at a time (the number of observations in each sub-sample is 190 
against 209 in the full sample). Results are shown in Figure A2, where each plot represents 
one particular sample (e.g. the “no Austria” plot reports estimation results for the euro-area 
sample without Austria). 
In order to ease the comparison between the results for each of the 11 sub-samples and 
for the base model estimates, we report for each parameter (here represented by a histogram 
bar) the difference of its sub-sample estimate against the corresponding result in the base 
model, divided by the standard error. The results indicate that sub-sample estimates never 
fall outside the corresponding 95% confidence intervals (two standard errors) of the base 
model estimates. In fact, even the larger discrepancies (such as those involved by excluding 
Greece, Finland or Ireland) rarely fall outside the ±1 range. 
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Legenda:
1 = Output gap (x)
2 = Primary balance (pb)
3 = Public debt (d)
4 = Maastricht variable (m)
5 = Regular elections in t
6 = Regular elections in t+1
no Austria no Belgium
no Finland
no France no Germany
no Greece
no Ireland no Italy no Netherlands
no Portugal no Spain
 
Figure A2 
NORMALISED DIFFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO THE BASE MODEL 
ESTIMATES OBTAINED BY EXCLUDING, IN TURN, 







































(1) Each parameter estimate (along the horizontal axis) is measured as the difference with 
respect to the corresponding estimate of the base model in terms of its standard error. In this 
way,  bins  bigger  than  two  in  absolute  value  suggest  that  the  corresponding  estimates 
(obtained excluding that country from the sample) lay outside the 95% confidence interval of 
the base model estimates.     48 
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